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Abstract – Cyber security operations centre (CSOC) is a 
horizontal business function responsible primarily for managing 
cyber incidents, in addition to cyber-attack detection, security 
monitoring, security incident triage, analysis and coordination. To 
monitor systems, networks, applications and services the CSOC 
must first on-board the systems and services onto their security 
monitoring and incident management platforms. Cyber 
Onboarding (a.k.a. Onboarding) is a specialist technical process of 
setting up and configuring systems and services to produce 
appropriate events, logs and metrics which are monitored through 
the CSOC security monitoring and incident management 
platform. First, logging must be enabled on the systems and 
applications, second, they must produce the right set of computing 
and security logs, events, traps and messages which are analysed 
by the detection controls, security analytics systems and security 
event monitoring systems such as SIEM, and sensors etc.; and 
further, network-wide information e.g. flow data, heartbeats and 
network traffic information are collected and analysed, and 
finally, threat intelligence data are ingested in real-time to detect, 
or be informed of threats which are out in the wild. While setting 
up a CSOC could be straightforward, unfortunately, the ‘people’ 
and ‘process’ aspects that underpin the CSOC are often 
challenging, complicated and occasionally unworkable. In this 
paper, CSOC and Cyber Onboarding are thoroughly discussed, 
and the differences between SOC vs SIEM are explained. Key 
challenges to Cyber Onboarding are identified through the 
reframing matrix methodology, obtained from four notable 
perspectives – Cyber Onboarding Perspective, CSOC Perspective, 
Client Perspective and Senior Management Team Perspective. 
Each of the views and interests are discussed, and finally, 
recommendations are provided based on lessons learned 
implementing CSOCs for many organisations – e.g. government 
departments, financial institutions and private sectors. 
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I. Introduction  
Cyber security operations centre (CSOC1) is a horizontal 
business function (as opposed to a capability), responsible for 
cyber security incident management, detection, monitoring, log 
and event management. It is a horizontal business function 
because it should be a SOC for the entire organisation, catering 
for the needs and requirements of all groups, units and 
departments of the entire organisation, as opposed to multiple, 
tactical, isolated, standalone and fragmented SOCs that lacks 
                                               
1 CSOC and SOC are used in this paper interchangeably, and means 
one and the same thing. 
situational awareness of the risks the organisation bears as a 
whole. 
 
SOC is a business requirement, and for some government 
departments, it is a mandatory business requirement, in 
addition to a compliance requirement (see Her Majesty’s 
Government (HMG) Security Policy Framework (SPF) [1]). 
This means that government departments are required to have 
SOCs, which may be interpreted as technical, process, policy 
and procedural (T3P) controls appropriate to detect, protect, 
and respond to incident, and however, of appropriate levels of 
their business impact assessments, and government security 
classifications assessment, such as OFFICIAL, SECRET and 
TOP SECRET2, to comply with the UK Government HMG 
security policy framework. 
 
As a horizontal business function, SOC executes the 
organisation’s cyber security strategy and monitors controls 
(technical, process, policy and procedural) that enable, support 
and enhance the overarching cyber strategy of the organisation. 
For example, if an organisation’s cyber strategy is one 
underpinned on active defence, it means that SOC activities 
should enable and support active defence to happen and 
including controls and policy mandates that promote and enable 
active defence, such as take down operations, tear down of 
connections, ports and services deemed malicious and 
suspicious etc. (see details of our proposed cyber security on 
Section IV of this paper). 
 
SOC is equally a compliance requirement and may be used to 
fulfill other compliance requirements and regimes such as to 
perform security or protective monitoring requirements, 
comply to payment card industry data security standard (PCI 
DSS) or information security standards (ISO 27001) and 
information security management system (ISMS) etc. 
 
Unfortunately, many organisations set up SOCs driven by 
compliance alone rather than for both active risk reduction and 
compliance. Majority of such SOCs are often generally not fit 
for purpose, (see extensive discussion in Section IV of this 
paper). 
 
Large enterprises, who claim to have experience setting up 
SOCs have not done better either, as interviews and/or 
2 UK Government Security Classification can be accessed from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-security-
classifications 
experiences across many sectors who have used known large 
enterprises to establish their SOCs or outsourced their SOC 
function to large enterprise supplier organisations do not seem 
content with the level of service they received and/or are not 
entirely content of the maturity of supplier SOC service, either. 
 
There are small to medium size (SME) supplier organisations 
who are specialist SOC providers, however, many of these 
SMEs are focused on the ‘design and build aspects of the SOC 
service’ and may struggle to operate the service due to the 
manpower or resource levels required to run a SOC; while a few 
of the SMEs are unknown brands and therefore find it extremely 
challenging to pass through the extraordinary economic, 
financial, commercial and procurement due diligence carried 
out by client organisations or government departments when 
procuring a SOC service, hence do not even get shortlisted to 
provide SOC services to large government departments or big 
financial institutions. Therefore, most of these specialist SOC 
SMEs operate at their equivalent tier of small to medium size 
client organisations. 
 
Building a SOC comprises two key aspects – first, building of 
the central log collection, aggregation, analysis and incident 
management platform (here we refer this to as the SOC 
Monitoring Platform), and the second, is onboarding or 
enabling of both new and existing services to be monitoring by 
the SOC monitoring platform, (here we refer this to as Cyber 
Onboarding).  
 
While a SOC monitoring platform may be built but the problem 
lays with onboarding services into it so that they can be securely 
and protectively monitored. We use the analogy of a property 
and its content. You could have an unfurnished property, where 
the property is built with the necessary doors and windows, but 
the property is empty and has no content, such as beds, chairs, 
cooker or electricity. The same can be said of a SOC monitoring 
platform without onboarding of the services and infrastructures 
it was built to monitor. Therefore, to have a functioning and 
operational SOC, then onboarding of services, systems and 
network infrastructure to the SOC monitoring platform must 
occur.  
 
Note: In this paper, we use ‘system’ in its generic term to mean 
and encompass computing device, its subsystems, applications 
installed in it, and the networking infrastructure. For example, 
computing devices include servers, desktops, workstations, 
mobile, Tablet; and its subsystems include compute, 
middleware, storage e.g. storage area network (SAN), network 
attached storage (NAS) etc. Applications installed in the system 
include databases, operating systems, and agents such as anti-
virus, intrusion detection systems, firewalls etc., while the 
underlaying networking infrastructure include routers, 
switches, fabric, hubs, cables etc. 
 
The contributions of this paper are:  
a) the differences between security information and 
event management (SIEM) and SOC are explained. 
b) the factors impacting Cyber Onboarding are examined 
using the reframing matrix methodology. 
c) recommendations to address the challenges facing 
organisation’s Cyber Onboarding function are offered. 
 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 
II discusses SOC vs SIEM, and in section III Cyber 
Onboarding is explained with a view to understanding its 
processes, activities and responsibilities. Section IV 
identifies and discusses factors affecting Cyber 
Onboarding deduced by applying the reframing matrix 
methodology. Section V offers recommendations to 
address Cyber Onboarding challenges, and finally, the 
paper is concluded in Section VI. 
 
 
II. SOC  vs  SIEM 
Many people conflate SOC with SIEM. This is the one primary 
confusion in this space. SIEM is a tool, which offers log 
management, event and log correlation, analysis and dashboard. 
Conversely, SOC is a horizontal business function comprising 
People, Process and Technology as shown in Figure 1, and 
expanded in Figure 2.  
 
A: People 
People may include analysts, administrators, incident 
responders, SOC manager and other managers etc. who are 
accountable for monitoring the organisations services by 
leveraging the capabilities offered by Technology (e.g. SIEM 
tool), and guided by the organisation’s policies, processes and 
procedures. So a SIEM is not a SOC. Rather, a SIEM is a 
component or a subset of a SOC.  
 
People are subdivided into two broad categories, namely: cyber 
onboarding people, and SOC monitoring and incident 
management personnel (see Figure 2). Cyber onboarding is a 
multidisciplinary team composed of solutions and technical 
architects, SOC designers, business analysts, risks and 
information assurance consultant and project managers (see 
Figure 2 and details in Section III). These are the people who 
carry out project related activities to ensure that each business 
service (a business service usually comprises, at the least, 
systems, network infrastructures and applications) to be 
monitored are properly onboarded to the SOC monitoring and 
incident management platform.  
 
SOC monitoring and incident management is solely responsible 
for security monitoring, operational monitoring of onboarded 
services that are in the SOC platform, providing ‘eyes-on-glass’ 
monitoring, alerting and event analysis, incident triage, cyber 
incident management, coordination and reporting. They are also 
the custodians for fascinating and coordinating major incidents, 
incident governance and command, investigations and post 
incident reports. 
 
 
 
B: Process 
SOC processes in this paper encompass operational guides, 
local working instructions (LWI), knowledge articles (KA), 
procedures and operations-level policies. A sample of some 
SOC essential processes (see Figure 2) are cyber incident 
management playbook, incident response process, operational 
runbook or knowledge articles, joiners, movers and leavers 
(JML) process, SOC access control policy, security operating 
procedures (SyOPS) etc. 
 
C: Technology 
The technology aspect, as shown in Figure 2,  comprise  of the 
tools that are deployed in a typical SOC, such as  SIEM, web 
fraud detection (WFD) to detect web-based transactional fraud, 
typically for financial orientated SOCs, IDS/IPS to detect 
and/or prevent intrusions, threat intelligence e.g. malware 
information sharing platform (MISP - an open source threat 
intel feed) and cyber incident management ticketing system for 
tracking security incidents tickets, assigning tasks and on-going 
incidents and issues. There are myriad of SOC tools, but the set 
discussed in this paper are core and essential. 
 
The SIEM market is very mature with well-established products 
and a set of criteria to assess their offerings, e.g. Gartner SIEM 
Magic Quadrant [2]. Mainstream tools range from leaders IBM 
QRadar and Micro Focus ArcSight to the niche players such as 
Alien Vault USM, FireEye etc.  
The misunderstanding is that many people procure SIEM tools 
and therefore believe they now have a SOC. This is absolutely 
incorrect. The tools, when setup properly, will no doubt help 
the SOC to perform its functions better, provided the ‘the 
challenging’ task of onboarding systems, logs, applications and 
networks to the SIEM is completed, including having the 
correct parsers, plugins or API (application programming 
interface) to ingest events from disparate log sources e.g. 
firewall, routers, applications, intrusion detection systems 
(IDS) etc. and also, the ability to ingest network-wide 
information such as flow events and threat intelligence 
information to detect emerging and inflight incidents [3, 4, 5]. 
 
A SOC must have the appropriate policies and processes to 
allow them to react swiftly to a cyber incident. For example, a 
SOC must have a cyber incident management playbook to 
respond to incident and coordinate significant cyber incidents 
[6], they should have other operating procedures such as 
security operating procedures (SyOPs), cyber recovery process, 
incident response process and reporting and escalation 
procedures. 
 
 
Figure 1: Security Operations Centre (SOC) 
 
Figure 2: Expanded diagram of the SOC (as shown in Figure 1) 
Human operators are required to monitor and conduct incident 
management and decision making. A SOC includes humans 
(a.k.a. people) who operate the SIEM, operationally monitor the 
dashboards and follow alerts and coordinate cyber incident 
response. These are some of the fundamental differences that 
make a SIEM not the same as a SOC. A SOC must have a 
human-in-the-loop, even with artificial intelligence (AI) and 
machine learning (ML) embedded endpoints and point 
solutions deployed in the SOC to better and faster detect 
incidents and threats, yet it needs human-in-the-loop to make 
decision and to conduct incident management and follow 
governance and incident commands. 
 
The drive to ‘outsource’ everything was met with ‘bring 
everything back in house’ a couple of years ago, and recently, 
we observe that most companies now operate a hybrid managed 
SOC model. This is the case, for example, where a framework 
exists for organisations to outsource some aspects of the SOC 
service e.g. protective monitoring or “eyes-on-glass” (a.k.a. 
operations security monitoring) responsibility to a supplier 
organisation while incident management remains their 
accountability. While there are many reasons for outsourcing 
SOC function to supplier organisations, the two main reasons 
are: 
a) The supplier organisation is tasked to do “the heavy 
lifting and shifting” – a perception that the expertise 
to run a functional SOC is readily available in the 
supplier organisation, hence it is believed that the 
supplier organisation is by far better to run and 
maintain a SOC service, while the client organisation 
becomes responsible for security incident 
management, escalation and decision making as the 
overarching risk owner.  
b) Most client organisations work 9am to 5pm, 
therefore, client organisations prefer to leverage the 
24x73 SOC service operated by the supplier 
organisations, a preference many client organisations 
believe to offer cost saving and value for money. 
 
 
III. Cyber Onboarding 
Cyber Onboarding follows a set of well-defined processes 
to onboard a service for cyber security monitoring (see 
Figure 3), covering discovery workshop, security 
monitoring requirements gathering, risk assessment, 
topology and architecture design, implementation, 
assurance and security testing, and handover.  
 
These distinct processes are discussed briefly:  
a) Discovery workshops are conducted per organisation, 
business unit or service to be onboard to the SOC 
monitoring platform in order to understand the specific 
monitoring needs of that organisation, business unit or 
service such that security monitoring is implemented 
                                               
3 24x7 means 24 hours in a day and 7 days in a week. 
4 Normalisation is a process of using a consistent schema to process 
data, events or logs in exactly the same way so that meta-data types 
appropriately to address the unique security 
monitoring requirements for that department, business 
unit or service.  
b) Solutions design, architecture and integration patterns 
are produced based on the organisation’s business 
needs, hosting arrangements, integration 
requirements, and connectivity options.  
c) Topology map of the existing hosted environments is 
required in order to allow appropriate monitoring use 
cases to be developed to ensure that critical assets of 
the organisation are protected.  
d) The implemented security monitoring solution will 
need to be tested and assured, and  
e) Finally the solution is handed over to the SOC to 
monitor and operate. 
 
Cyber Onboarding is a team in a SOC function responsible for 
ensuring that business services to be monitored by the SOC are 
appropriately onboarded to the SOC monitoring platform. This 
means, ensuring that the business services and the underpinning 
infrastructure and applications within that business area, such 
as firewalls, servers, desktops and network infrastructures are 
configured to produce logs and events, and that these events are 
transported and ingested by the SOC monitoring platform for 
analysis, correlation, alerting and incident triage (see Figure 4).  
 
In some organisations, both the cyber onboarding team and the 
SOC monitoring and incident management team are the same; 
however, in this paper, we have presented these teams as 
distinct but cooperative teams under one management. Hence, 
the cyber onboarding may not exist as a distinct business unit 
in most organisations as their duties are performed by the SOC 
under one accountability business unit. Regardless, the cyber 
onboarding activities as shown in Figure 4, must be performed 
to have a functioning and operational SOC.  
 
These activities include: 
• creating design patterns and implementing 
architecture solutions for any service (existing or new) 
to be onboarded to the SOC platform for security 
monitoring;  
• ensuring the assets of the business units to be 
monitored are enabled for logging and events 
generated by these disparate log sources are ingested 
and monitored by the SOC; 
• enabling the right parsers and plugins so that logs are 
normalised4 and forwarded to the SOC platform; 
• ensuring that a transport mechanism exists for 
conveying logs, metrics, events, messages and flows 
from disparate environments to a central log 
collection, aggregation and analysis point for the SOC 
monitoring platform. 
are stored on the same columns, for optimised querying and database 
performance 
 
Figure 3: Cyber Onboarding Process 
 
Figure 4: Cyber Onboarding Activities 
Figure 4 is a representation of the activities carried out by the 
Cyber Onboarding team for the SOC.  
 
These include:  
a) Ingest mechanisms: This is a method to ensure that the 
different and disparate log types generated by the vast 
array of log sources in the monitored estates are 
appropriately ingested, normalised and analysed by 
the SIEM platform. This means ensuring that an ingest 
mechanism exist e.g., agentless, parser, API and 
plugin (see log source types in  
Table 1) for the appropriate log type and format; 
otherwise, custom parsers must be developed. Custom 
parsers are especially important for ingesting 
proprietary logs whose schemas do not comply or 
conform with appropriate and known standards, e.g. 
logging standards such as the IETF RFC 5424 format5.  
 
Table 1:Monitoring Metric and Formats [3] 
S-N Log Source 
Type 
Log Source Example  
1 Events and logs Raw log, Alert, Event, 
Windows events, Syslog, 
Alarm 
2 Network 
Information  
Heartbeat, Flow, Session, 
Trap 
3 Structured 
Digital Feed 
Scan, Vulnerability 
Information, PCAP6, 
TVM7, CMDB8, NVD9 
4 Semi and 
Unstructured 
Digital 
Trace, Manual Input, 
Wetware  
5 Threat 
Intelligence  
Indicators of Compromise 
(IoC) 
b) Agent vs agentless: Agent and agentless are both 
mechanisms to ingest events by the SIEM. Agent-
based ingest requires a third-party application or a 
package of the SIEM to be installed at the end device 
or endpoint. This is needed, in most cases, when the 
SIEM tool does not have a matching plugin to ingest 
logs or events of a particular log source type. For 
example, windows events do not follow the IETF RFC 
5424 standard hence one way to ingest windows 
events is to install a third-party agent or software at the 
endpoint to convert windows events to syslog 
compliant format – this processing of using a third-
party software or an agent to ingest logs and event is 
regarded as agent-based ingestion. The other option is 
to use agentless method where a third-party agent is 
not required, instead the SIEM tool accepts native or 
raw logs or uses API to receives and ingest the events. 
                                               
5 RFC 5424 – The Syslog Protocol, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5424 
6 PCAP – Packet Capture 
7 TVM – Threat and Vulnerability Management 
c) Design development: The primary function of the 
technical and solutions architects in the cyber 
onboarding team is to develop robust and reusable 
architecture patterns, solutions design and integration 
patterns artefacts that allow various systems and 
business services hosted in different locations to be 
integrated to the SOC monitoring platform, allowing 
the SOC to securely monitor these services and 
systems. The created reusable architecture and 
solutions artefacts are signed-off and approved by the 
organisation’s technical design authorities. 
d) Implementation and testing: This allows the design 
artefacts to be implemented and tested. Testing can be 
carried out by other specialist teams, however, this 
activity should be coordinated through the cyber 
onboarding team, since they are the project-based arm 
of the SOC. Testing should not only include assurance 
testing, but also, security testing such as IT health 
checks, penetration testing and vulnerability scanning 
and testing. This is done so that any vulnerability 
(intrinsic or extrinsic) are mitigated prior to go-live. 
Since IT health checks are carried to establish intrinsic 
and extrinsic cyber hygiene of the solution, then it is 
best to be conducted by an external or independent 
provider (this is to avoid bias), however, the 
continuous vulnerability and threat management 
should still remain an in-house activity. 
e) Tagging framework: This is a process of tagging 
events from specific business services as a way of 
distinguishing and separating services and this is 
particularly important in a multi-tenant and multi-
customer SOC service, where incident response and 
escalation maybe different for each business services. 
Tagging is not only used to differentiate services, but 
also useful to manage business services with 
overlapping IP addresses, and where name resolution 
is not working properly. 
f) Alerting and tuning: This is a process of improving the 
reliability of the service by ensuring that ‘noise’ and 
false positives are reduced and minimised. This is 
done by filtering out known noise on the monitored 
environment to improve both performance and 
reliability. The purpose of tuning is to baseline the 
service so that SOC alerts/alarms are reliable and 
trustworthy. Tuning do take time and could be 
considerably longer depending on size, scale and 
complexity of the SOC platform. On the average, it is 
common to allow three to six months for this. 
g) Network groupings: This is a process of customising 
networks and subnets into their appropriate business 
areas, functions and groups to allow for quicker 
identification of incidents to affected business areas 
and networks. 
8 CMDB – Configuration and Management Database 
9 NVD – National Vulnerability Database 
h) Content development: This is a process of setting up 
some of the SOC monitoring artefacts such as rules, 
filters, use cases, queries and dashboards etc. 
Monitoring content is important as different business 
services may face unique risks and concerns; 
therefore, it is essential that the use cases are adapted 
to address their respective concerns and risks.  
i) Report development: This is a process of creating both 
generic and custom monitoring reports for each 
business area and business service being monitored. 
Reports are used for many purposes, e.g. to assess the 
performance of the SOC service, benchmark the SOC 
service, review service and operation level agreements 
(SLA/OLA), key performance indicators (KPI), and 
most importantly, to measure the return on security 
investment (RoSI). Cyber metrics such as report 
against the risks mitigated, report on threats prevented 
or incidents encountered can be useful barometers to 
assess RoSI of the SOC. Sample SOC reports include 
SOC operations report, Good Practice Guide number 
13 (GPG 1310) report and custom reports, which can 
be used for a number of other compliance purposes. 
 
 
IV. Why is Onboarding “Broken”? 
To build a mature and effective SOC takes time, especially 
one for a large enterprise, such as a government department or 
financial institution. It is a project that could easily span 
between 2-4 years dependent on a number of factors, e.g. 
technical, programmatic, commercial, logistic and 
organisational. For instance, the footprint of the estate to be 
monitored, the number hosting environments to be monitored, 
size, coverage and complexity of the organisation, the quality 
of monitoring required and the size of the project workforce, 
structure and organisation – internal, external, suppliers and 
partners, procurement frameworks and vehicle etc. 
 
As discussed in Section III, Cyber Onboarding is a multi-
stakeholder project involving multidisciplinary activities. 
Managing projects involving multiple stakeholders is 
challenging on its own, let alone doing so for a complex and 
challenging project. Since the main aim of this paper is to 
understand factors or reasons why many perceive cyber 
onboarding to be ‘broken’, we employ a proven methodology – 
the reframing matrix. 
 
The reframing matrix [7], created by Michael Morgan [8], is a 
tool for critical reflection, insight and innovation. An ideal tool 
for analysing organisational issues from various perspectives 
that then allows the problem to be viewed from multi-
stakeholder perspectives and viewpoints encouraging issues to 
be seen from different lens, opinions and insights.  
 
                                               
10 Protective monitoring of HMG system guide - good practice guide 
number 13 –. A defunct guidance but still being reference by many 
UK government departments. 
As a problem-solving tool, the reframing matrix uses the four 
perspectives (4Ps) for insights, viewpoints, interests and 
concerns. Each quadrant of the matrix is a perspective. The 
problem to be solved is placed at the centre of the matrix, and 
opinions, views and concerns are then sought from the 
respective stakeholders. Based on the different views, solutions 
to the problems are obtained. It is pertinent that the stakeholders 
(4Ps) are selected based on their relevance and importance to 
the problem domain since the strength of the reframing matrix 
lies on the fact the different stakeholders with different 
experiences approach problems in different ways. 
 
Our application of the reframing matrix to cyber onboarding is 
as shown in Figure 5. First, we put the question been assessed 
in the middle of a grid. We use boxes around the grid for the 
different perspectives. Each perspective represents a 
stakeholder group consulted in the assessment. The 4Ps are the 
Onboarding Team themselves, the CSOC team, the Client and 
the Senior Management Team. 
 
Using the reframing matrix to identify the challenges faced by 
cyber onboarding (as shown in Figure 5), we identified 16 
different issues from four perspective, namely (clockwise):  
• Onboarding perspective – as the function 
responsible for onboarding services for different 
clients and business units, they deal with the day-to-
day fallouts and know the issue best, however, from a 
unique perspective.  
• CSOC perspective – as the custodian for security 
monitoring, and people at the frontline’ of the SOC 
service, so it is important that they are consulted for 
any reliable solution to the cyber onboarding problem 
to be identified, besides, they are the direct 
‘customers’ of the Cyber Onboarding Team.  
• Client Perspective – it is important that we consulted 
the client for a say, after all, they pay and consume the 
SOC service. If they are not happy then the business 
case for standing a SOC capability could easily 
disintegrate.  
• SMT perspective – these are the senior management 
team, comprising the SRO, CTO, Directors and Heads 
of service. SMT are sponsor, fund and are accountable 
for the SOC service, therefore has an interest and a 
viewpoint of the problem.  
The 16 issues identified are briefly explained. 
 
From Onboarding perspective, they feel that lacked SMT 
support on a couple of organisational and process issues. They 
feel SOC is not mature in their operations and skillsets. There 
is a sense of acceptance that cyber onboarding is indeed 
complex and complicated, and there are a number of 
dependencies hindering progress. 
 
Figure 5: Cyber Onboarding Reframing Matrix 
From CSOC perspective, they feel they are not provided with 
enough information feeds to monitor. So the onboarding team 
are not onboarding systems and services quick enough. There 
is quality issues and incomplete documentations provided to 
them, which then impacts how quickly they can react, and also, 
they feel there are many screens to monitor.  
 
From Client perspective, there is appreciation of lack of funds. 
So they do not have funds to pay for the SOC service, and they 
feel they should not have to pay for a SOC service operated in-
house, therefore the funding model is not appropriate. They said 
there is nothing to show for security monitoring even when it is 
enabled because they do not receive regular reports or KPIs for 
the SOC service, and they feel cyber onboarding is very time 
consuming to rollout. 
 
From SMT perspective, they feel cyber onboarding is costing 
them far too much, hence it is an upscale project. They feel that 
the metrics and progress they receive from the onboarding team 
is not clear most times, and that the governance and structure 
between CSOC and Onboarding teams should be improved. 
 
Following the reframing matrix analysis (see Figure 5), we 
conducted a further assessment to see if some of the viewpoints 
could converge. The 16 viewpoints are now consolidated to 8 
key factors that make cyber onboarding challenging and often 
perceived to be ‘broken’, as follows: 
 
A) Complexity 
If cyber onboarding is simple then establishing a functioning 
SOC would not have been so difficult, unfortunately, this is not 
the case. The process to onboard a service is straightforward in 
principle (see Figure 3) but often challenging in practice. For 
example, a service to be onboarded may be hosted in multiple 
locations and comprising a myriad of different log sources, 
across the stack, ranging from physical, network, operating 
systems, middleware, databases to applications. In addition, for 
a cloud service, this may include hypervisors and/or containers, 
which also need to be monitored. Each of these stacks will need 
to be monitored to have a truly complete service onboarding. 
The problem is that many of these stacks produce logs and 
messages in varying formats (see Table 1) most of which are 
non-compliant with the IETF RFC 5424 standard, and a couple 
may include proprietary formats, especially applications coded 
in non-compliant formats, therefore the mechanism to ingest 
and normalise these events is not so trivial. All of these 
contribute to the complexity, complication and convolutedness. 
 
Additional factors contributing to complexity include A1-A3: 
 
 
A1) Architecture designs and patterns 
SOC design and architecture is not a one size fits all. Each 
service onboarding requires a unique design, and at best may 
leverage existing patterns which will still need to be adapted 
and implemented, and at worst, a new set of designs are to be 
produced. The design requirements may be different to the 
overall design of the SOC monitoring platform itself, therefore, 
each service to be onboarded will need its own design and 
solutions architecture, which may utilise existing network 
connectivity or the provisioning of a new network connectivity 
to transports logs, events or messages of the onboarded business 
services to the SOC platform for analysis, correlation and cyber 
incident triage. The network connectivity (local area networks 
included) may require a form of wide area network, routing, and 
security controls enabled to ensure that appropriate policies 
such as access controls, security groups, blacklisting and 
firewall policies are correctly implemented. 
 
A2) Risk assessment 
Each business services to be monitored has its own risks or 
concerns for why it needs security monitoring. For example, a 
bank implementing security monitoring for their online banking 
system may do so in order that the SOC will monitor its online 
bank transactions, hence the risks or concerns are about 
monitoring of their online banking transactions and ensuring 
the right customers and correct payments are made; however 
for a government department responsible for immigration or 
issuance of national passports, their risks and concerns for 
security monitoring is obviously different. Here, their concern 
is to ensure that national passports are only issued to legitimate 
citizens, that passports are not flaunted on ‘black market’, and 
illegitimate documents are not used to obtain national passports. 
Security risks and concerns are bound to be different based on 
business functions for different corporations, institutions and 
government departments. These unique risks and concerns will 
need to be turned into security monitoring use cases and 
policies. This process requires niche skillsets, not trivial, and 
adds a layer of complexity, too. 
 
A3) Security monitoring requirements 
As organisations’ business offerings and services are different 
so are their security monitoring needs. Security monitoring 
requirements will differ among departments, business units and 
services, therefore onboarding of each department, business 
unit or service is bound to be subtly different. While onboarding 
may follow a fairly straightforward process, however, each 
business service onboarding requires unique set of solutions 
ranging from architecture pattern to monitoring use cases.  
 
Take two UK Government Departments for comparison. The 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) for example, their 
primary responsibility to the UK citizens and government is 
social welfare to UK citizens in the form of housing allowances, 
job seekers’ allowances etc. to appropriate UK citizens, and on 
a timely manner. Conversely, HM Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) is responsible for collecting taxes e.g. VAT, annual 
returns, PAYE, customs etc. from citizens and corporations, 
hence the former’s cyber security monitoring need is focusing 
on ensuring appropriate social welfare arrangements are paid to 
suitably qualified citizens while the latter ensures and enforces 
taxes are received from citizens and corporations. Of course, 
their security monitoring requirements are different and 
predicated on their business obligations. This goes to 
demonstrate again that security monitoring and cyber 
onboarding is not a one size fits all proposition. This uniqueness 
and tailoring of the cyber onboarding deliverables per business 
service onboarding adds a layer of complexity and intricacy. 
 
B) Strategic Support 
SOC, like every organisational cyber security programme, has 
a slim chance of success without strategic support from the 
senior management teams (SMT). Strategic support is 
particularly fundamental with SOCs because of its remit, since 
it serves both as a horizontal business function, and as a 
compliance mandate. Without strategic support, SOC will be 
unable to perform its role of compliance, audit and regulations. 
 
One of the main challenges facing SOCs is having appropriate 
authority to conduct protective and security monitoring across 
an entire organisation if SMT have not lend their support and 
approval. SOC is a horizontal business function, meaning it 
should be instituted to serve all business units of an entire 
organisation and should have the prerequisite authority to 
perform audit, security compliance checks and as an enabler to 
drive continuous security improvements across the 
organisation. This is important since cyber-attacks can be 
exploited from any aspect of the organisation and may use a 
weakness in one aspect as a channel or conduit to exploit other 
parts of the business. Hence, SOCs must be empowered, as 
monitoring custodians, to perform its duties accordingly. 
 
C) Funding Model 
SOC is an upscale project, requiring the procurement and 
implementation of a myriad of cyber tools, such as SIEM, 
intrusion detection systems, flow analyser, transaction 
monitoring (web fraud detection), threat intelligence and 
possibly user and entity behaviour analytics (UEBA) etc. These 
tools can be expensive, including software licenses and 
professional services costs. In addition, the SOC needs facility 
– the physical operating environment, and human resources to 
operate and monitor the service and including handling incident 
response and management. Considering that the project, 
depending on the organisation’s size and scale, may last for a 
couple of years from start to go-live, and subsequently, the 
operational people aspect to manage and operate the SOC as 
normal business as usual (BAU) staff, who must still be costed, 
then, it is essential that the right funding model for the SOC 
exists. 
 
The absence of appropriate funding model is likely to impact 
the success, or the effectiveness of a SOC. SOCs are a medium 
to address cyber risk and encourage good cyber hygiene, it is 
therefore pertinent that SOC’s funding model is based around 
active risk reduction as other funding models is likely to 
encourage ‘wrong cyber behaviour’. For example, the ‘right 
cyber behaviour’ is to encourage active risk reduction as 
opposed to risk mitigation approach based on ‘low hanging 
fruit’. The reasons for this are that ‘easy and quick wins’ do not 
necessarily mean effective prioritisation and efficient risk 
reduction, because the ‘quick wins’ may not yield the same risk 
reduction. We posit that, based on risk proportionality, 
monitoring an organisation’s asset that is either marked for 
decommissioning or that is not particularly important to the 
organisation does not yield the same risk reduction as opposed 
to monitoring the origination’s customer database, or their 
intellectual property.  
 
Similarly, protectively monitoring a standalone guest WiFi just 
because the guest WiFi project is funded as opposed to offering 
the same security monitoring on citizens data based on risk 
reduction encourages wrong cyber behaviour. 
 
Our proposal to addressing the ‘cyber behaviour problem’, one 
we strongly recommend, is to ensure that SOC – here we mean 
SOC and its composite teams such as Cyber Onboarding – is 
directly funded. We distinguish between direct vs central 
funding. Direct funding, we define as funding allocated 
directly by the organisation, usually granted or assigned to a 
business unit and ringfenced for its purpose alone and secured 
through a business case. On the other hand, Central funding, 
we define as a type of funding arrangement which is obtained 
by collectively levying other business units as a contribution for 
payment of service they have received, or will receive, and are 
often referred to as ‘cross-charge’.  
 
SOCs should be directly funded to afford it the autonomy to 
onboard and monitor services that actively attribute to actual 
risk reduction. Prioritisation of services to be monitored by the 
SOC must not be decided or dictated solely on the basis that an 
individual business unit has funds or budget, but because the 
services to be onboarded are those that will reduce risk 
exposure in the ecosystem and to the organisation as a whole.  
 
The premise for onboarding a service just because the project 
has funds is totally unacceptable. We see this as one of the main 
drivers of wrong cyber behaviour across many government 
departments. Fundamentally, if a SOC is centrally funded, it 
means it has no choice as to which services it monitors, because 
it will be underpinned on ‘first come, first served’. That is, the 
SOC will serve those who have contributed or paid for their 
services and this may mean monitoring services of lesser 
priority/criticality over those that are significantly critical. 
 
D) Strategy 
Every efficient SOC has a clear strategy underpinned by the 
organisation’s Cyber Strategy. Every organisation should have 
a Cyber Strategy. An organisation cyber strategy is a blueprint 
for cyber, business transformation, business enablers, 
governance, risk and compliance. 
                                               
11 We use ovals to represent the organisation strategy, the GRC and 
SOC strategies because in reality, such strategies will continuously 
 
Organisation Cyber Strategy should adopt cyber principles that 
encourage, support and enable business and digital 
transformation agenda, e.g. digital by default, secure by default, 
active risk management, active defence, proactive and 
continuous monitoring, cyber resilience and recovery etc. These 
are the enablers of strong economic wellbeing, creating an 
environment where businesses thrive by ensuring that digital 
technology and its frontier are secure. The UK Cyber Strategy 
[9], a blueprint for national cyber security strategy, aims to 
create an environment where businesses are confident, capable 
and resilient in transformational digital world.  
 
For both national and organisational cyber security strategy to 
be achieved, investments in SOC, Cyber Programme, 
Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC), Personnel and 
Physical security, Cyber Security Training, Awareness and 
Education need to occur.  
 
Figure 6: Conceptual Cyber Security Strategy supporting and 
enabling programme-level strategies 
In Figure 6, we present our proposed conceptual organisation 
cyber strategy. It starts with an organisation-wide Cyber 
Strategy underpinned by GRC and SOC strategies. GRC 
provides the steer, direction and metrics for ‘what good looks 
like’, while SOC executes and monitors.  
 
The proposed cyber strategy is conceptual, which makes easily 
adaptive. The rationale for proposing one is because often cyber 
strategies are discussed in abstraction, so we thought a better 
way to evolve the discussion is by providing a conceptual 
blueprint. As shown in Figure 6 are three concentric ovals (not 
circles11), the overarching one being the organisation-wide 
cyber strategy, supported by the GRC strategy, and 
underpinned by a stronger but much smaller oval, which is the 
SOC strategy. The various smaller circles each represent 
programme-level strategies being enabled by the Cyber and 
improve, hence, will be at odd with the geometric properties of a 
circle. 
GRC strategies and supported by the SOC. A SOC strategy is 
not one that supports and enables the overarching 
organisational cyber strategy, but also, one that creates a 
continuum for it to be implemented, practiced and embedded. 
We argue that the dependability of both the GRC and SOC 
makes the organisation-wide cyber strategy and all the other 
programme-level strategies achievable, reliable and capable. 
 
E) Goals and Objectives 
With Cyber and SOC strategies come functional goals and 
objectives. Functional objectives help achieve business goals, 
and both in turn enable the strategy to be achieved. 
 
To achieve the SOC strategy, high-level business goals which 
are fulfilled by low-level functional objectives must exist. A 
successful SOC function (comprising people, process and 
technology) is realised on overarching strategy, business goals 
and functional objectives. 
 
Using the Cyber strategy discussed in Section IV D) as an 
example, a primary goal of the SOC will be to provide realtime 
security monitoring across the monitored estates. The rationale 
for this goal is that a goal must directly support its strategy; 
therefore, to support the SOC strategy of active defence and 
digital transformation a key enabler is proactive and realtime 
security monitoring. Further, a key functional objective to 
achieve the business goal, will be to ensure that the SOC has 
trained and capable personnel to operate the SOC (i.e. towards 
SOC maturity).  
 
For SOC to be successful, it must have clear set of goals and 
objectives that support its strategy, and the wider Cyber 
Strategy. 
 
F) Governance and Onboarding Prioritisation 
Every organisation should have governance boards, well-
defined governance structure, and clear delineation of roles and 
responsibilities. At a strategic level, there should be a Cyber 
Governance Board accountable for Cyber. Membership to this 
board should include the following, at the very least, Cyber 
SRO, Director of Cybersecurity, Head of GRC, SOC 
Director/Head, Programme-Level Directors from Business 
Services. This board should be responsible for deciding on the 
critical services and systems, through a risk based prioritisation, 
to be onboarded for security monitoring. 
 
Further, organisational governance structure and hierarchy 
must be clear so that SOC knows who is in charge with clear 
point of escalation and reporting. It is important that such 
structures are communicated not only to the SOC, but also, to 
the entire organisation. After all, security is everyone’s 
responsibility. 
 
There must be a clear set of rationale based on active risk 
management for the candidate systems and services to be 
prioritised. The risk-based prioritisation scheme should take 
into consideration such metrics as: 
• sensitivity of the assets 
• criticality of the asset e.g. critical national 
infrastructure  
• value of business data it holds e.g. citizens data, 
business data, national data 
• value at loss 
• degree of susceptibility of attack 
• vulnerability of the asset, or that may exist with the 
controls currently protecting the asset 
• mean time to restore 
• disaster recovery targets 
• cyber response and recovery objectives 
 
G) SOC Structure and Approach 
All the capabilities shown in Figure 2 should sit under one SOC 
structure. Getting a SOC structure right cannot be overstated. 
It is often the prime causes of an inefficient and immature SOC. 
The rationale for recommending that all the composite aspects 
of a SOC sits under one authority is because, it works better and 
more coherent under one leadership. 
 
If some of the functions, such as Cyber Onboarding were to be 
under a different structure or authority it will cause friction and 
fester the perception of ‘them’ and ‘us’ mentality, which is 
needless. Secondly, coherence is key for an effective SOC. That 
is, the ability to have consistency in processes, administration, 
methodologies and communication. Communication is 
important. Information from the SOC to the entire organisation 
should be concise and consistent. 
 
A SOC structure should support and enable its approach. There 
are various approaches to operating a SOC, and in this, we are 
referring to the operating model rather than whether it is 
outsourced or insourced. The operating model, that is, the SOC 
operating service hours, for example, 24x7 or 9x5 or 7x7 plus 
on-call hours. Operating model is governed by business cases 
determined by the ways of working of all the other stakeholders 
performing reliant activities either for the SOC or to the 
business. 
 
Most SOCs operate 24x7 service, which means they work 
round the clock, 24 hours in a day, 7 days in a week, including 
Saturdays, Sundays and bank holidays. While some SOCs 
operate 24x7, this could be arranged as 9x5 plus on-call for after 
hours and weekend; or 7x7 services complemented with on-call 
for after hours. Either way, the objective is to have a service 
coverage that supports the organisation’s risk appetite and that 
are relevant and efficient. 
 
It is pertinent to note that, for example, if a SOC operates 24x7, 
but some business teams or stakeholder groups are not, then it 
may make the need for 24x7 SOC ineffective, because if an 
incident happens during non-working hours and the business 
teams that are needed to assist with the incident, e.g. networks 
and infrastructure teams are not 24x7, it then means that the 
incident will be queued to this team and will be in their queue 
until when they start work in the following morning. This is not 
an ideal case and one the puts the effectiveness of the SOC in 
jeopardy. 
 
SOC operating model must be approved by the SMT based on 
business case, benefit realisation and business efficiencies. It is 
important to note that, SOC can operate 24x7 in many formats 
efficiently as discussed prior. 
 
H) SOC Maturity 
SOC maturity is assessed against many factors, unfortunately, 
there is no consensus on the factors or criteria that should be 
used. In this paper, we have carefully selected five generic 
criteria, we believe should help with operating an effective SOC 
underpinned on risk reduction, in our assessment. Further, we 
have also provided a list of some quantitative and qualitative 
factors that organisations may consider when conducting SOC 
assessment of their own. 
 
The generic factors include: 
1. adequate and capably trained staff,  
2. robust SOC and Onboarding processes, policies and 
procedures, 
3. appropriately tuned SIEM tool, 
4. cyber incident management, reporting and 
investigation, 
5. threat intelligence and threat hunting. 
 
The maturity of a SOC can be assessed on other factors such as 
qualitative factors e.g.  
• quality of logging  
• how quickly the SOC can recover from a cyber-attack 
• how quickly they can respond to a significant cyber 
incident 
• cyber response and recovery readiness 
• forensic readiness 
 
On the other hand, SOC maturity can be assessed by 
quantitative factors such as: 
• the number of true positives or incidents the SOC 
detects 
• the volume of data analysed in seconds or minutes,  
• the number of events processed,  
• the number of metrics used in the analysis, e.g. logs, 
events, flows, PCAP and traps (see Table 1) and  
• finally, if monitoring is across the full stack of 
infrastructure, operating systems, middleware, 
containers, databases and applications. 
Whichever criteria (generic, quantitative, qualitative or a 
combination of all) are used to assess the maturity of a SOC, 
there must be rationale for their uses. 
 
I) Supplier Incentive  
As discussed in Section IV, to build a SOC service often 
involves multiple stakeholders ranging from internal teams e.g. 
SOC team, networks and infrastructure teams, to external 
organisations e.g., suppliers and professional services partners. 
 
For instances, a supplier may be responsible for hosting, 
another for management of existing legacy services and another 
for deployment of new services. Whatever their responsibilities 
are, to deploy a SOC multiple stakeholders are often required. 
Since the main objective of a SOC is to ensure that all services 
to be monitored, whether in the supplier environment, hosted 
applications or cloud-based applications are onboarded, 
therefore, the SOC will deal with a range of multiple 
stakeholders and should have a plan to incentivise suppliers and 
delivery partners in order that the desired outcomes are 
achieved. 
 
Supplier incentives could be by way of communication to the 
supplier community of the SOC strategy, and the need for 
cooperation in order for all assets to be onboarded.  This may 
include change notices and contract change notices (that is, 
payment related change notices), impacting and assessment 
processes that are lean and workable. In addition, supplier 
incentives may take other forms of collaborative frameworks or 
memorandum of understanding, such as co-location agreements 
or deployment of third-party applications into an existing 
hosting arrangements or procurement of new contractual 
arrangements. 
 
 
V. Recommendations  
Our recommendations stem from arguments in the preceding 
sections of this paper. The recommendations are MoSCoW’ed 
(Must, Should, Could or Would) to highlight importance, as 
follows: 
 
a) An organisation must have a cyber strategy upon 
which SOC strategy and other programme-level 
strategies hinge, such as network operations centre 
(NOC) strategy, network and infrastructure strategy, 
programme management strategy etc. The absence of 
a cyber strategy will mean that there is no coherent 
organisation-wide blueprint to work toward, and this 
is likely to lead to standalone, tower-based models that 
are fragmented, isolated and divergent.  
b) A SOC strategy should support and enable the 
organisation’s cyber strategy and offer a mechanism to 
deliver the cyber strategy. 
c) Governance, structure and approach must exist, and 
are fundamental to achieving a fit for purpose and 
functional SOC. It is imperative to have clear 
delineation of roles and responsibilities and a distinct 
line of escalation and reporting, as these will build the 
enabling environment for an efficient SOC. 
d) All SOC composite teams as shown in Figure 2 should 
be under one authority and governance structure as this 
will enable the SOC to operate much more efficiently. 
SOC is complex and adding extra layer of complexity 
by way of segmenting SOC composite teams under 
different governance may stifle SOC progress and its 
autonomy. 
e) Whether SOC is funded centrally or directly, having 
its own ring-fenced funds devolved from individually 
funded projects allows it to make security decision 
based on risks rather than funding. Onboarding 
prioritisation or selection of candidate services to be 
continuously and protectively monitored based on 
funding drives wrong behaviour as we have seen in 
Section IV C). Hence onboarding prioritisation of 
candidate system to be monitored must be based on 
active risk reduction. 
f) Finally, as SOC is both a horizontal business function 
and compliance mandate, therefore, it should be 
assessed so that business return on investment and 
return on cyber security investment are measurable. 
SOC maturity is one way of achieving this and it is 
pertinent that the organisation is clear on what metrics 
or criteria they want to use to measure this growth. As 
discussed in this paper, we have offered three sets of 
assessment factors including quantitative, qualitative 
and generic (see Section IV H). 
 
 
VI. Conclusions  
SOC is a major organisational investment driven by two needs: 
a) cyber security needs of detection, monitoring, 
response and recovery from cyber-attacks, especially 
since modern cyber-attacks are emerging, complex 
and challenging. 
b) compliance mandate to satisfy regulatory and 
compliance obligations such as the HMG security 
policy framework, PCI DSS, ISO 27001 and other 
compliance regimes. 
 
Building an efficient SOC takes time and effort. Organisations 
must have a roadmap of SOC delivery aligned with capability 
and maturity. This is so that it can assess its achievements but 
more so, to be better planned. 
 
SOC is not a one-size-fits-all. Even when a SOC is built for a 
single organisation, business unit requirements will be 
different, and risks and concerns are likely to be subtly different 
and hence SOC and security monitoring use cases must be 
adapted, tailored and relevant. 
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While SOC processes maybe straightforward, however its 
success is dependent on cooperation from multiple 
stakeholders, and in most cases suppliers; therefore, 
organisations that find themselves in a similar model should 
have an approach to incentivise suppliers and stakeholders in 
order that their overarching goals and objectives are 
accomplished. 
 
Finally, SOC must have an operating model, and this must be 
predicated on business case, relevance and wider stakeholders’ 
ways of working. For example, a SOC can operate 24x7 in 
multiple ways; and of course, should not operate 24x7 if the 
organisation’s business case and risk appetite dictate 
differently. 
 
 
Future work 
Three key areas of future work either for the authors or for other 
researchers, and maybe to form a PhD study are as follows: 
• It will be helpful if research on organisational cyber 
security behaviour is conducted to assess what factors 
drive good or wrong cyber behaviours among 
organisations, e.g. compliance, funding models, 
governance structure, complexity etc.  
• It will be useful to have agreed set of SOC maturity 
metrics. While we have provided three compelling set 
of metrics (quantitative, qualitative and generic) on 
SOC maturity, we believe, it still requires further in-
depth studies. 
• Finally, it would be interesting to conduct the same 
research the authors have carried out in this paper from 
a SOC supplier standpoint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
[5] C. Onwubiko (2015), “Cyber Security Operations Centre: 
Security Monitoring for Protecting Business and Supporting 
Cyber Defense Strategy, published in 2015 International 
Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics 
and Assessment (CyberSA)   
[6] C. Onwubiko and K. Ouazzane (2019), “SOTER: A Playbook 
for Cyber Security Incident Management” yet unpublished. 
[7] Mindtools (2018), “The Reframing Matrix”, accessed 30th 
December 2018, 
https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newCT_05.htm  
[8] M. Morgan (1993), “Creating Workforce Innovation”, 
Business and Professional Publishing, Sydney, 1993 
[9] HMG (2016), “National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021”, 
1 November 2016. 
                                               
